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The ResTO-TerRiN Project: Contribution to the Systemic Modeling of Technical and 
Organizational Issues of a Territory Exposed to Natech Risk 
 
Abstract  
This paper presents a brief summary of work being carried out under the Franco-Japanese 
research project ResTO TerRiN. The main goal of the project is to produce relevant knowledge 
and effective methods and tools to improve the resilience of a territory against Natech accidents 
(chemical accidents triggered by natural hazards) especially those due to flood / tsunami.  
The work is based on a posteriori (in Japan and France) and a priori analysis of the industrial as 
well as the local governments’  emergency management to the Natech accidents during the 
Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami (GEJET) and during severe flooding events in France. 
Survey questionnaires in Japan and France are being applied to chemical facilities, to 
government agencies, and to citizens in France and Japan The data collected are used to model 
the impact of the natural hazard events on the facilities and the safety barriers, as well as the 
community and overall social impacts. These results are then used to understand societal and 
territorial resilience to these complex disasters and propose a Natech resilience model. In this 
paper we present the preliminary results of the ongoing work in Japan. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Chemical accidents triggered by natural hazards (known 
as Natechs) are relatively rare. In fact they represent 
between 2 – 7 % of all chemical accidents reported in 
databases in Europe and the United States, and show an 
increasing trend in the last 30 years (Sengul et al. 2012; 
Santella et al. 2011). Growing urban populations and 
industrialization in areas subject to natural hazards, coupled 
with environmental change due to climate change and other 
factors will contribute to an increase in the number of 
Natech accidents in the years to come (Cruz and Krausmann 
2013). 
Natural hazards are generally taken into account in the 
design of chemical plants by insuring that buildings and 
structures are built to codes. Nonetheless, they are mostly 
absent in process hazard assessment and chemical accident 
prevention programs. Thus, the safety and mitigation 
measures, and emergency response plans to prevent and 
respond to chemical accidents concurrent with natural 
disasters may not be effective under the natural disaster 
conditions. Furthermore, local government and civil 
protection authorities are often not aware of or not familiar 
with the dangers posed by certain industrial activities 
lacking knowledge and/ or training about chemicals and 
their potential health effects (Cruz et al. 2006).  
Natech risk management is relatively complex. These 
technological accidents occur while the "system which 
should provide resilience" are already under "stress" due to 
the concurrent natural hazard event. In the case of a Natech 
the industrial plant is both impacted by the natural hazard 
event, and may become the source of additional “hazards” 
due to the release/ potential release of hazardous materials 
which may have direct and indirect impacts offsite to nearby 
residents and communities. 
This project studies these aspects by considering two 
levels of analysis: the scale of the industrial site, called 
microscopic scale, and the scale of the territory or society, 
called macroscopic scale. These two spatial scales look at 
the problem from the perspective of "vulnerability" and via a 
comprehensive analysis of the notion of territorial or societal 
resilience to Natech accidents. With regard to the 
microscopic scale, we aim to improve the understanding of 
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the physical and organizational vulnerability of industrial 
facilities exposed to natural hazards (particularly tsunamis 
and floods), to identify and define prevention and protection 
measures, to ensure that plant owners/operators and 
emergency organizations are able to cope with Natech 
events. The idea is to provide to industrial risk managers 
tools and guides for improved Natech risk management 
during both prevention and response. With regard to the 
macroscopic scale, the objective of this project is to build a 
Natech resilience model through the identification of Natech 
resilience criteria. In this paper we present the preliminary 
results of research work being carried out in Japan. 
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
 
The project consortium involves a multi-disciplinary 
team of researchers from Japan and France. In both countries 
data has been collected through interviews, field visits, 
survey questionnairesin case study areas: in the Tohoku area 
(Japan) and in several industrial areas in France, particularly 
the Presqu’île d’Ambès (Gironde). Furthermore, we review 
reports, documents and the scientific literature. This 
peninsula, in the north of Bordeaux, is located between two 
rivers (the Garonne and the Dordogne) not far from the 
Atlantic coast. Therefore, this territory can be inundated by 
both river floods and storm surges. There are several small 
and large facilities (11 SEVESO sites and ICPE plants) 
along the Garonne banks. The overall population of the 
peninsula, which is exposed to both technological and 
natural risks, is about 30.000. Thus, this territory is 
appropriate for the analysis of the flood natech events, 
although there have been no natech accidents to date 
(several SEVESO sites were inundated by the 1999 storm, 
and some technological accidents have taken place, but 
never a technological accident has been triggered by flood 
events). 
In Japan, the main objective is to collect and analyze 
data and extract lessons learned from Natech events 
triggered by the Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami 
disaster of March 2011. Through field visits and person-to 
person interviews with industrial and government officials it 
has been possible to construct event trees and fault trees of 
the most important accidents triggered by the earthquake and 
tsunami. Furthermore, through mail surveys of industry and 
local residents we are assessing Natech disaster risk 
reduction practices, risk perception and disaster 
preparedness for these types of events. In this paper we 
present preliminary results of two mail surveys. One to 
industrial facilities in affected areas in Miyagi Prefecture, 
and the other to residents living near a refinery in Sendai 
that suffered fires after the tsunami.  
An industrial mail survey was sent out through the Japan 
Industrial and Medical Gases Association (JIMGA) in 
Sendai to member companies. JIMGA had the contact 
information of these companies and was able to contact their 
managers directly even if the facilities were not in operation. 
We present here a summary of the responses of 21 
companies. The industrial survey asked questions regarding 
damages and losses, performance of safety and mitigation 
measures, and the opertional readiness/ effectiveness of the 
emergency response. The resident/ household survey asked 
questions regarding risk perception of Natech hazards, 
disaster preparedness and the evacuation for the tsunami as 
well as the Natech accidents. 
The household survey was led by research team 
members at Kobe University to residents living within an 
area of 2km in radius from the source of a Natech accident 
that occurred at the JX Refinery following the tsunami. The 
purpose of the survey was to understand residents’ attitude 
and protective actions such as evacuation due to the Natech. 
The questionnaire also inquired about damages to homes or 
injuries to residents, and the evacuation order issuing 
process. 
In France, a priori analysis of the industrials as well as 
the local governments’ (e.g., city and prefecture 
governments, fire division/ departments, industrial 
emergency responders) involved in the management of the 
Natech disasters during severe flooding events or storm 
surges is led. By the way of field visits, survey 
questionnaires, and interviews, we identify and map all 
players/actors and their responsibility, mechanisms, public 
policies and tools which are used in planning for natural and 
technological emergencies. The aim is to represent the 
organizational and management frameworks to identify 
criteria which could characterize the global natech resilience 
of the territory. Moreover, we are capitalizing the knowledge 
of the industrials to improve our understanding of how they 
manage natural disasters, technological accidents and 
eventually natech events. These data are used to construct 
various models (systemic model, functional representation, 
statistical models and risk models). Subsequently, these 
models are used to elaborate the guidelines/tools, identify 
the resilience criteria. In this paper, we present the first 
elements of a model built to assess the flood-induced Natech 
vulnerability of an industrial site. 
 
 
3. PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
3.1 Survey of Industrial Facilities  
The interviews, field visits and mail survey to industrial 
facilities have provided important information concerning 
damage and losses, chemical accidents and spills triggered 
by the earthquake and tsunami, the vulnerability of the 
facilities, the accident consequences, the performance of 
safety and mitigation measures, and the overall emergency 
response to contain them. The interviews and visits to 
affected companies have provided detailed information 
about the accident mechanisms and cascading events, and 
has allowed the construction of flow diagrams, event trees 
and fault trees. Figure 1 presents an event tree of the impact 
of the earthquake and tsunami at a refinery and other nearby 
facilities at an industrial park in Sendai. It is important to 
note that in Figure 1, the cascade of events, direct and 
indirect, that contributed to the triggering of releases and/ or 
spills, and escalation into a large fire. Some of the steps in 
the chain (e.g., oil spill spread by flood waters) of cascading 
events would not normally occur during day-to-day plant 
operation, and therefore may be overlooked if the potential 
for natural hazard loads are not considered in the risk 
assessment of chemical process plants. Detailed fault trees 
have been constructed to identify common cause failures and 
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key line of events. 
The mail surveys provided additional important 
information about impacted facilities. Table 1 presents a 
summary of the characteristics of the industrial facilities 
surveyed thus far. The majority of facilities are nationally 
owned, small and medium size, chemical companies with 50 
or less employees. 40% of the companies were subject to 
strong ground shaking (Shindo scale: 6 plus), 30% were 
subject to ground shaking intensity of 5 or higher, and the 
other 30 % did not know. Six companies said their plants 
were subject to tsunami inundation heights of 3.0 meters or 
higher, with one of these reporting 9.5 m. See Table 2. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Event tree showing the impact of the Great East 
Japan earthquake and tsunami at a refinery and an industrial 
park in Sendai. 
 
All of the facilities reported some kind of damage. 76% 
of the facilities said they were directly damaged by the 
earthquake while 52% said the facilities were directly 
damaged (e.g., direct damage due to strong ground shaking; 
direct impact by tsunami wave and damage due to 
hydrodynamic and hydrostatic loads) by the tsunami. 
Indirect damages (e.g., collapse of nearby building on 
equipment; impact by floating debris) from the earthquake 
and the tsunami were also reported. Table 3 shows the 
statistics concerning overall damage at the facilities 
surveyed. It is important to note that the region experienced 
several large aftershocks causing additional direct and 
indirect damages at more than half of the facilities. 
Furthermore, all of the facilities reported that they had to 
partially or completely shut down after the disaster. 
Complete shutdown of operations occurred at 18 facilities 
(86%) and 3 reported partial shutdown. Table 4 shows the 
causes of total or partial shutdown. 81% of facilities 
indicated ‘loss of electricity’ as one of the contributing 
factors for the total or partial shutdown, followed by 76% of 
facilities that indicated that direct / indirect damage 
contributed to the shutdown. 
 
Table 1. Industrial facility characteristics 
 
 
 
Despite the fact that 17 facilities suffered total or partial 
damage, only five reported the release of hazardous 
materials. Two of the releases occurred due to the 
earthquake, one due to the earthquake and tsunami, and two 
due to the tsunami. Two of the releases occurred sometime 
after the earthquake, while the tsunami-triggered releases 
occurred during the tsunami. Earthquake damage of storage 
tanks, pipelines and other equipment occurred due to 
structural failure of support structures, overturning of 
equipment and buckling, among other causes. Tsunami 
damage occurred due to inundation and water intrusion, 
debris impact and floating-off of equipment. Table 5 
summarizes these findings.  
 
 Table 2. Reported tsunami inundation heights at the 
surveyed companies. 
 
 
Table 3. Overall damage  
 
 
 
Table 4. Causes of total and partial shutdown 
 
 No. of facilities Percent 
Multinational  1 5% 
Plant size   
  Small 13 62% 
  Medium 5 24% 
  Large 2 10% 
No. of employees   
  (0-50) 18 86% 
  (51-200) 0 0% 
(201+) 3 14% 
Type of industry   
Chemical (High pressure gas ) 18 86% 
Oil refinery 2 10% 
Metallurgical 1 5% 
N 21  !
Tsunami inundation height- 
h (m) 
Number of facilities 
(N = 21) 
Not flooded 5 
Less than 1 m 1 
1 ≤ h < 3.0 2 ≤ 3.0 6 
Unknown 7 !
Damages No. of 
facilities 
Percent 
Earthquake   
Direct damage 16 76% 
Indirect damage 16 76% 
Tsunami   
Direct damage 11 52% 
Indirect damage 8 38% 
Aftershock   
Direct damage 11 52% 
Indirect damage 11 52% 
Totally shut down 18 86% 
Partially shut down 3 19% 
N 21  !
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Table 6 summarizes damages to emergency response 
systems (including buildings, equipment and resources) by 
the earthquake and the tsunami.  
 
 
Table 5. Failure modes leading to chemical releases 
 
 
 
Damage to emergency response systems included direct 
damage to fire stations and fire trucks onsite, inundation of 
low lying emergency response equipment such as pumps and 
motors, floating off of emergency water pipelines, loss of 
utilities at emergency response/ services buildings, damage 
to IT equipment and damage to communication systems. 
Most facilities completely evacuated the plant sites before 
the arrival of the tsunami. Two facilities indicated that they 
had staff who stayed onsite. During the person-to-person 
interviews, several staff indicated that in the future, facilities 
in flood prone/ tsunami prone areas need to maintain 
emergency boats to move around once the danger has passed 
to rescue stranded workers or residents, or perform 
emergency response actions. 
 
Table 6. Number of facilities reporting damage to 
emergency response systems  
 
 
3.2 Preliminary Findings of the Household Survey 
The mail survey was sent to a random sample of 1,632 
households, and 484 households responded, for a response 
rate of 29.4 %. Figure 2 presents the distribution of (a) 
sampled households and (b) returned questionnaires (Yu et 
al. 2015).  
We used risk likelihood and severity to measure the risk 
perception levels by asking: how likely did you think a 
Natech would be a threat to your lives or property before the 
Tohoku earthquake, just after the earthquake shaking, and in 
the future 10 years. Furthermore, we asked to what extent 
residents felt that a Natech would affect their lives or 
property before the Tohoku earthquake, just after the 
earthquake shaking, when they perceived the danger of the 
Natech, when they received the Natech evacuation order, 
while staying at the evacuation shelters, and in the future 10 
years.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Distribution of (a) sampled households and (b) 
number of households completing the questionnaire (Source : 
Yu et al. 2015). 
 
One of the more interesting results of the survey is the 
fact that residents evacuated more than once. In fact 65% of 
respondents said they evacuated at least one time; over 30% 
evacuated the first time because of the Natech accident not 
the tsunami. Almost 50 % of the total that evacuated the first 
time, evacuated a second time, and over 66% of those that 
evacuated a second time, had to evacuate a third time. Some 
residents had to change shelter more than four times. Many 
residents evacuated on their own initiative without waiting 
for authorities to issue an evacuation order. During 
person-to-person interviews with residents, some indicated 
that there was a lack of clear information regarding where it 
was safe to evacuate to, or what they had to do in order to 
protect themselves and their families. 
The survey asked about households’ risk perception. The 
results show that people’s risk perception in terms of the 
perceived likelihood that a Natech would cause harm to their 
lives or property increased (as expected) after experiencing 
the Natech during the Tohoku earthquake.  However, as 
presented in Fig 3, no change was found for risk perception 
in terms of the perceived severity of the impacts of a Natech 
accident when compared with their responses before the 
Tohoku earthquake and in the next 10 years. This may be 
because no deaths, injuries or severe environmental damage 
due to the Natech was reported. We found that households 
felt that the Natech was very serious when: a. they perceived 
its occurrence, b. while they were staying at the first/second 
evacuation shelter, and c. when they received the Natech 
evacuation order. 
Using logistic regression models, we also analyzed how 
risk perceptions together with geographic and demographic 
variables influenced people’s evacuation decisions due to 
the Natech danger in order to comply with official orders. 
 No. of 
facilities 
Percent 
Direct/indirect damage 16 76% 
Blocked transportation routes 3 14% 
Loss of electricity 17 81% 
Lack of fuel supply 1 5% 
Supplier company was damaged  
 
2 
 
10% 
No/loss of backup power 
generation 
 
3 
 
14% 
Loss of water 1 5% 
N 21  !
 
No. of 
facilities 
Percent 
Earthquake damage (N=9)   
Failure of welds 3 33% 
Failure of support structure  2 22% 
Pipe damage  2 22% 
Overturning of vessels/pump, etc. 3 33% 
Foundation buckling 1 11% 
Other damage (earthquake sensor) 1 11% 
Tsunami damages (N=10)   
Inundation 6 60% 
Flotation  2 20% 
Impact by debris 3 30% 
Other (loss of electricity/ damage to 
warehouse)  
 
2 
 
20% !
Damages No. of  facilities Percent 
Earthquake 5 24% 
Tsunami 7 33% 
na 9  
N 21  !
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Results showed that wind direction (B=2044, exp(B)=11.41, 
p≤0.01) and people’s perception of the Natech severity when 
they perceived its occurrence motivated (B=1.77, 
exp(B)=5.89, p≤0.05) more people to evacuate. And we also 
found that being a female (B= 1.22, exp(B)=3.40, p≤0.01) 
made it more likely to comply with the Natech evacuation 
order.  
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Mean risk likelihood rating for natech (where 0 is 
not likely, and 5 is very likely) (Source: Yu et al. 2015). 
 
 
Fig. 4 Mean risk severity ratings for Natech throughout 
the evacuation process (where 0 is no severe impacts 
expected to 4 very severe impacts expected) (Source: Yu et 
al. 2015). 
 
At last, to our surprise, results showed that people’s 
perception about the Natech severity when they received the 
Natech evacuation orders played a negative role in 
evacuation motivation (B=-0.95, exp(B)=0.39, p≤0.05). This 
may due to the fact that many evacuees were reluctant to 
evacuate again for a Natech because they had already 
evacuated due to the earthquake/tsunami. Even those who 
have higher severity risk perception about the Natech when 
they received the Natech evacuation order were less likely to 
evacuate again. This finding may be important to emergency 
mangers or local officers to make a more effective plan to 
protect evacuees who may need to evacuate more than once.  
 
3.3 First Elements of a Model to Assess 
Flood-Induced Natech Vulnerability of an Industrial 
Site (El Hajj et al., 2015) 
 
The tools used to assess the vulnerability of industrial 
sites versus flood-induced Natech, will use final generic 
accidental scenarios (model) in the form of fault trees 
(Vesely et al., 1981).  
This model is based, on the one hand, on all the data 
collected during the project, and on the other hand, on a 
systematic risk analysis methodology. The systematic 
approach uses the MADS model, which is the French 
acronym for “Analysis Method of Dysfunctional Systems” 
(Périlhon 2007), (Lesbats et al. 2014). These models are 
built in three steps :  
 
a. Conceptual modeling of an industrial installation: This 
model is divided into several sub-systems responsible 
for triggering major accidents in case of flooding of an 
industrial site. The decomposition is an important step to 
facilitate the risk analysis: It is used to organize the 
information obtained through experience feedback and 
to conduct a rigorous analysis.  
b.  MADS analysis. By adopting the MADS MOSAR 
methodology and building on the analysis of past 
accidents, each sub-system of the industrial installation 
will be analyzed in order to understand how it would be 
responsible for major accidents in case of floods. 
Therefore, the identification of potential hazards and 
their process are established. 
c. Accident scenarios development: In order to identify 
potential accidents triggered by flood events, a fault tree 
is associated to each sub-system. 
 
Building on the analysis of data collected during the 
project, only parts of an industrial installation which are 
involved, directly or indirectly, in the generation of major 
accidents during floods were considered (sub systems). We 
have identified 6 sub systems (fig. 5): 
- Critical equipment (hazardous materials containing 
equipment such as atmospheric storage tanks, 
atmospheric reactors and pipes…) 
- Building structures, 
- Intern utilities (heating, cooling systems…), 
- Safety barriers 
- Control and supervision systems, 
- Intern hazardous materials release emergency 
organization. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Conceptual modeling of an industrial installation 
during a Natech event. 
 
In a second step, an analysis of each sub-system of the 
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industrial installation was done in order to find how it can be 
impacted by the natural hazard (target of hazard flow) and 
how it could be considered, after a flood event, as a system 
causing mechanical shocks (ch), overpressure (Pr), heat 
radiation (th), pollution (P), electrical hazards (el) and 
regulation and energetic hazards (En) (source of hazard). For 
instance, for the critical equipment atmospheric storage tank, 
the following questions are asked systematically: how the 
atmospheric storage tank can cause mechanical shocks, 
overpressure, heat radiation…following a direct contact with 
floodwaters or, indirectly after the inundation of the site. 
Therefore, the main hazard flows between all the 
sub-systems that can be observed after a flood episode of an 
industrial installation and all the potential hazards in an 
industrial site were identified. The results of this systematic 
analysis were presented in a table containing the different 
elements of the MADS hazard flow.  
In a third step, based on the various tables containing the 
different elements of the MADS hazard flow, fault tree are 
built for each sub system. For example Fig. 6 presents the 
fault tree of the sub system Electricity utility. 
 
 
 
Fig.6 Fault tree of Electricity utility. 
 
Consequently, the final results of our work will be the 
development of generic accident scenarios triggered by 
flood events. These scenarios will be built using all the fault 
trees of the various sub systems which can be impacted 
during a flood event. They can be used for flood Natech risk 
analysis, a diagnosis tool based on these scenarios to find the 
weak points regarding technological accidents triggered by 
floods and finally recommendations on how to mitigate 
these accidents in the form of a list of preventive and 
protective measures. 
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
 
These preliminary results have highlighted that natural 
hazard events can directly and/ or indirectly impact 
industrial facilities that handle hazardous materials resulting 
in spills or smaller releases, which may escalate to major 
accidents through cascading events including due to the loss 
of lifeline systems and emergency response capabilities. 
The survey facilities suffered damages and losses, but 
less than 20 % actually experienced releases. It is not clear at 
this point whether this is due to their location (located in a 
less vulnerable area), good risk management practices, or 
other causes. This needs to be further studied. 
Further research is continuing with a focus on how to 
improve the effectiveness of the evacuation orders by 
identifying when, where, and how to issue and disseminate 
information about chemical accidents, and what emergency 
response actions residents can take (particularly in the 
absence of warnings or evacuation orders from local 
authorities). Another key point is to understand the 
dynamics of multiple evacuations such as identifying which 
groups are more likely willing to evacuate more than once 
and what factors are more effective in motivating them. 
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